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THE AMERICAN LANDSCAPE IN THE 
ERA OF POSTMODERNITY1 
LEO MARX 
University of M.I.T. 
Flying from the East to the West coast of the United States at 36,000 feet on a 
clear spring day you might be tempted, even now, to describe the terrain below by 
assigning its parts to the old familiar categories: city, countryside, and wild nature. The 
further west you fly, the fewer cities you see, a fact that seems to reconfirm the standard 
moral geography of North America: to move west is to move from civilization toward 
nature, from a more artificial to a more natural terrain. Extensive greening begins with 
the dark stretches of forest along the Appalachian range, and it spills over into the 
agricultura! mid-west, a vast patchwork of farms in shades of lighter green and tan 
segmented by the rectilinear grid pattem of the geological surveys, with occasional 
built areas (small towns or mere clusters of buildings), the whole terrain criss-crossed 
by whitish bands of highway. The huge central plain, referred to in media accounts of 
the Oklahoma City bombing as «the nation's heartland,» is what sorne Americans still 
call «the country,>> short for «countryside. >> According to recent census figures, the 
nation 's population is gravitating toward its coastal cities, andas the relative size of the 
heartland population declines, a growing majority crowds into that roughly l % of the 
national land mass occupied by cities. Later, flying over the Nevada desert and the 
Rock y Mountains, you might suppose that you are looking down on pieces of unspoiled 
wildemess -geographic embodiments of non-human «Nature» in its pure state. 
At ground leve!, however, this airbome impression of a tripartite topography 
proves to be unreliable. Not one of the postulated sectors -city, countryside, nature-
l. A lecture initially prepared for delivery at the second Congress of the Spanish Society 
for Jhe Study of the United StaJes in Seville, May 25, 1995; a slightly revised version also was 
given to the Annual Conference of the Council of Educators in Landscape Architecture in Ames. 
Iowa, September 9, 1995. 
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actually displays the distinct, unambiguous defining properties that it seemed to dis-
play from six miles up in the sky. Visiting a typical American city, the sky traveller soon 
realizes how little it resembles the ideal type: a densely populated built environment 
clearly divided into discrete, identifiable sectors: a downtown core, an uptown, a circle 
of separable suburbs, anda more or less discernible edge where the countryside begins. 
If such a classic, and (in Kevin Lynch's usage) clearly «visible» American City ever 
existed, it began to disappear at roughly the same time, severa! decades ago, as the 
concept of «megalopolis» gained currency. 2 «Megalopolis,» a cluster of cities embedded 
in an interspersed suburban, exurban, quasi-rural sprawl, was a precursor of the 
incoherent mix of forms that marks the postmodern urban landscape. 
At ground leve! the countryside also differs markedly from the sky traveler's 
impression, with its illusory vestiges of the stereotypical American farmland: a clearly 
demarcated terrain made up of quasi-independent small towns, villages, and farms -
the fanns inhabited (and ostensibly owned) by the families that work them. This 
difference, to be sure, is less visible than that observed in the cities. Yet we know, from 
other evidence -demographic, literary, joumalistic- that the distinctive way of life 
associated with America's fannland has virtually disappeared. For decades people have 
been abandoning the farmhouses and small towns. Severa! contiguous fanns often ha ve 
been merged into single working units, with one family living in one house, overseeing 
the production of the whole cluster; sometimes the family is merely the hired agent of 
an absentee corporate owner. lt is not clear how to describe (or what to call) this new 
rural scene, or the characteristic way of life of those who now inhabit the site of what 
was supposed to be a single family subsistence farm - fantasy home of Jefferson 's 
independent American yeoman. 
When we come to the wildemess - <<nature» in its unspoiled, ostensibly pristine 
state - we meet a less tangible kind of change: - a change in language, in meaning. 
Nowadays, in fact, the meaning of «nature» is far more problematic - and more in ten sel y 
contested - than the meaning of either «city» or «Countryside.» In English the word 
«nature» never has had an explicit or s table topographical referent; it has been 
indiscriminately applied to rural or wild terrains, and, for that matter, to ali non-urban, 
underdeveloped places, even small oases of green in cities and suburbs; nor has the idea 
ofnature had any other single, clear meaning. Today, however, in the skeptical climate 
of postmodemism - and of the ideological conflicts within the envirorunental movement 
- the word «nature,» along with such other overblown abstract nouns as «civilization,» 
«culture,» «humanism,» and «progress,» ranks high on the list of endangered linguistic 
species. These are ali key words in the grand narrative of the progress of Western 
civilization, one of the prime targets of postmodemism. As Fredric Jameson bluntly 
2. Kevin Lynch, The lmage of the City (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960). 
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asserts, «Postmodernism is what you have when the modemization process is comple-
te, and nature is gone for good.»3 
In what follows 1 want to relate the recent transformation of the American 
landscape to the concept of postmodernity. To what extent can we attribute recent changes 
in the character and meaning of the tri-sectored national terrain - unspoiled nature, 
countryside, and city - to the forces said to define a distinctive postmodern era? If, as 
J will suggest, the old spatial categories have lost much of their usefulness - at least 
for purposes of cultural analysis and understanding - with what should they be replaced? 
How shall we now think about these distinctions of place? First, however, let me explain 
what I mean by «postmodernity.» 
l. POSTMODERNITY AND POSTMODERNISM 
«Postmodernity,» as I use the terrn, refers to an era, whereas «postmodernism» 
refers to a theory or doctrine-ene that may well derive from, or embody, the distinctive 
mentality of the putative postmodern era. But I ha ve not found any wholly satisfactory 
version of postmodemism, that is, a single theory that persuasively identifies the decisive, 
comprehensive attributes - and accounts for the origin-of postmodernity. This lea ves 
open the question of whether a distinct postmodem era exists or, put differently, whether 
the emergen ce of that era 's ostensible attributes constitutes a sharp «break» with - or 
merely a new phase of - the era of modemity?~ In either case, «postmodernity» is a 
valuable provisional name for the phase of contemporary history that began sorne three 
decades ago - 1970 is a widely invoked date - and that is identifiable with certain 
specific socio-economic, technological, and cultural developments. 
3. Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism. or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: 
Duke University Press. 1991 ), p.ix. Other conceptions of postmodemity that have influenced my 
thinking include !hose of David Harvey. The Condition of Postmodernity (London: BlackweU, 
1989), Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodem Co11ditio11: A Report on Know!edge (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1988). and Edward W. Soja, Postmodem Geographies, The 
Reassertion of Space in Cririca/ Social Theory (London: Verso. 1989. 
4 . The leading theorists of postmodemism differ on this much-discussed issue. Jameson is 
more inclined to credit the occurrence of an historical «break,» whereas Harvey and Soja regard 
postmodemity chiefly as a further development of modemity. My own preference is for the concept, 
developed by Emest Mande!, Eric Hobsbawm, and David Gorden, and endorsed by Soja 
(op.cit.,p .3), of modemization as having occurred in a series of «long waves» beginning in the era 
of the Enlightenmem and culminating in a founh, curren!, postmodem wave. In any case, the 
issue from the historian 's viewpoint is essentially one of periodization - and it is not likely to be 
resolved soon, if ever. (Scholars still disagree about the temporal boundaries, indeed the very 
ex.istence, ofthe Renaissance.) It seems wise, for the moment, to accept the banal assumption that 
postmodemity is at once an extension of, and a reaction against, the modemization process, and 
that at Ieast sorne of its attributes are distinctive. and without precedent. 
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The advent of postmodernity initially was linked to the critical reaction, beginning 
in the l 960s, against modernism as a style of expression; the shift away from high 
modemism was most conspicuous in architecture, where the reigning mode of minirnalist 
functionalism was repudiated, and supplanted by a new eclecticism, a new tolerance 
for the decorative, for self-conscious innovative display, and for a pastiche of earlier 
styles. To call these stylistic innovations «post-modero» made perfectly good sense. 
Analogous departures from high moderoism already had become manifest in literature, 
in other arts, in a new critical theory, and in many scholarly disciplines. 
But it also was apparent that the transition from a modero to postmodem cultu-
ral sty/e was bound up, somehow, with the more or less simultaneous economic transition, 
independently observed by social theorists, from an industrial to a post-industrial or 
service society5 Taken together, indeed, these convergen! changes seemed extensive 
enough to justify the idea that a distinctively new, postmodem era had begun. Of the 
defining attributes of the new era, Jet me cite the four most relevan! to the present 
argument. 
(l) The Global Triumph of Corporate Capitalism. The steadily increasing 
domination of the world market by Jarge transnational corporations, many of them 
originating in, or based in, the United States, many of them in the service sector that 
includes finance, information, and entertainment industries. The final stage of this 
process, beginning after World War II, culminated in the collapse of the USSR, the 
dominant system's leading rival. 
(2) The Electronic Revolution. The global diffusion of new technologies of 
communication and computation (television, the personal computer, video, compact 
disc, fax), has made possible the instantaneous worldwide transmission of words and 
moving images (including news, monetary transactions, and ali kinds of information); 
the creation of centrally managed interactive worldwide data banks, information and 
entertainment networks, and the global dissemination of the products of cultural 
production, much of it originating in the United States. 
(3) The Global Dominion of Commercial Popular Culture. The eclipse of the 
formerly privileged, elitist, aesthetically severe, intellectually rigorous and demanding, 
print-oriented, Eurocentric high culture by a far more widely disseminated, accessible, 
latitudinarian, oral- and image- and media-oriented, commercial popular culture. The 
content of the culture industry's product is in large measure determined by the formats 
of electronic production for, and transmission by, television, cable, film, video, compact 
disc, CD-Rom; by the collaborative effort of the advertising, marketing, and 
entertainment industries to generate Jarge audiences, the highest possible Jevels of 
5. The most influential of many books on this theme probably were Alain Touraine, La 
Societé Post-lndustrielle: Naissance d' une Societé (Paris: Editions Denoel, 1969); Daniel Bell, 
The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basic Books, 
1973). 
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consumer demand, ali designed to satisfy the ruling imperatives of commercial 
entertainment - to celebrate the new global order and to deliver maximum retums on 
invested capital. The prevailing discourse of the electronic media is marked - with 
notable but relatively few exceptions by brevity ; discontinuity; low affect; primer level 
ideas; anda paucity of conceptual coherence. The positive aspect ofthe new pop culture, 
from the vantage of democratic values, is that it is non-hierarchical: its products are 
accessible to ali. The corresponding negative aspect is that the realm of culture is 
transformed into a lucrative commodity marketplace. Unlike the older high culture, 
whose products had relatively little value as commodities, and therefore enjoyed the 
freedom that carne with quasi-autonomy, the globally distributed commodities produced 
by the popular electronic culture eam huge profits, and therefore are subject to varying 
degrees of market- and state-imposed constraint tantamount to a kind of virtual 
censorship. 
(4) Philosophical Skepticism and Relativism. The rise to prominence of a new 
mode of critica! theory, an amalgam of philosophic, linguistic, anthropological, and 
literary-critical ideas and strategies that constitutes the analytic (ostensibly liberatory) 
method of postmodemism; its characteristic doctrines are feminist, egalitarian, anti-
Westem, and multi-culturalist. Its most significant component is a powerful 
epistemological skepticism directed at any and all claims to universal knowledge. This 
anti-foundationalist outlook, which denies the possibility of access to any timeless, 
context-free ground for «objective» knowledge or «the truth,» leads to the embrace of 
uncompromising cultural and cognitive relativism. Whatever their differences on other 
matters, adherents of postmodemism tend to agree about the equivoca!, inevitably 
unstable, culturally embedded character of ali thought; they assume that cardinal ideas 
like nature, countryside, and the city, are historically and socially constructed, and that 
their meaning always is determined - and Jimited - by the outlook and interests of 
the particular social groups that embrace them. 
But it is perfectly reasonable to credit the existence of a postmodern era without 
endorsing this, or any other version ofpostmodernism. My subject, in any event, is not 
postmodemism; it is postmodemity, the historical context, as manifested by recent 
changes in American geography, culture, and society, in which postmodem ism 
presumably acose. Retuming now to those changes, l want to consider the extent to 
which they illuminate and are illuminated by - the concept of a distinctly postmodem 
era. 
2. WILDERNESS, UNSPOILED NATURE, AND JUST PLAIN NATURE 
Students of American culture have special reason to heed Raymond Williams's 
assertion that <<nature» is the most complex word in the English language. From the 
beginning of exploration and settlement, Europeans projected diametrically opposed 
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meanings upon the landscape of the New World. At first, indeed, they often described 
North America as an ahistoric desert, a virtually untouched wildemess. Nature, in this 
Eurocentric sense, referred to the entire continent and, indeed the entire non-human 
world. Later, with the increasing secularization of western culture, nature was invested 
with many attributes of divinity. It carne to be seen by Emerson, a progenitor of the 
American environmental consciousness, as «the present expositor ofthe divine mind.»6 
Since it carne under the skeptical gaze of postmodemists, the close identification of 
America with a sacralized natural terrain has lost much of its credibility; and now, 
suddenly, nature is said to be «gone forever.» 
What can that possibly mean? Obviously nature, in the literal everyday biophysical 
sense, has not disappeared. Yet the statement has at least two important, related, and not 
implausible meanings. The first has to do with substantial, material changes in the 
natural world, the second with related conceptual changes in the meaning of the word 
«nature.» 
The beginning of the postmodem era coincided with the heightening of public 
awareness ofhumanity's new capacity to inflict severe, possibly irremediable, damage 
on the global environment. The despoilation resulting from the Hiroshima bomb, glo-
bal warming, and ozone depletion represented the potentially disastrous consequences 
of such unprecedented technological power. If the atmospheric envelope of the earth 
has been penetrated and altered, then so, in a sense, has every place, every thing, on the 
planet's surface. The upper atmosphere was the last remaining sector of the ancient 
frontier that always had separated humanity from a tangible, accessible portion of 
untouched «wild» nature. The closing of this frontier marks the potentially limitless 
reach of humanity's earthly power: its capacity to alter - to establish dominion over 
- every particle of the global environment. This is one meaning of the assertion that 
nature now is gone forever. 
The second meaning, as formulated by Bill McKibben in his influential book, 
The End of Nature. is a logical corollary of the first. 7 If we no longer can regard any 
portien of earthly nature as wholly Other, then, McKibben argues, the concept of nature 
loses much of its efficacy as a material embodiment ofultimate meaning and value. We 
thus have deprived ourselves of access to that class of natural facts that had been the 
object of - that had made possible - a vital experience of transcendence; those facts 
invited, or were hospitable to, a reverence for the natural (not incompatible with 
evolutionary biology) as the ultimate ground of Being. (If «nature» is a name for the 
cosmos that existed befare - and that presumably will continue to exist after - the 
lifespan of the human spccies, then it is a plausible object of naturalistic, or secular, 
6. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nature ,Addresses and Lectures (Philadelphia: John D. Morris 
& Co, 1906), p.63. 
7. Bill McKibben, The End of Narure (New York: Random House, 1989). 
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reverence.) This version of natural theology, or «natural supematuralism,» as expounded 
by Emerson, Thoreau, and Muir, is the metaphysical basis of what is probably the most 
influential American form of environmental consciousness. On a less exalted plane, it 
also nurtured the popular 19th-century nationalistic faith in the United States as «Nature 's 
Nation.»8 In the transition to the postmodem era, however, this belief in America's 
privileged access to nature has lost much, if not all, of its credibility. This is the second 
meaning of the proposition that nature is now gone forever. 
But the consequences of these changes in the status and meaning of <<nature» 
should not be overstated. The continuing physical presence of seeming «wildemess» or 
its simulacra - exemplified by the remaining uninhabited expanses of forest, desert, 
and mountain country - continues to exert a strong influence on the nation 's collective 
mentality. Its importance for the environmental movement cannot be underestimated; it 
is still possible to regard a significan! portion of the land as existing in a relatively 
undefiled state. In a 1995 essay, for example, the same Bill McKibben who so recently 
had written a larnent for the «end» of nature, reports on the astonishing recovery, in the 
last few decades, ofthe forests along the eastem seaboard ofthe United States. More of 
the region is forested today, he contends, than at any time since theAmerican revolution; 
much of the original wild life also has returned.9 This development illustrates the 
exceptionally fluid, evanescent, unpredictable, ambiguous character of the postmodern 
era, and more specifically, of current changes in the rneaning of such ostensibly reliable 
rubrics of reality as wildemess, countryside, and city. 
3. THE COUNTRYSIDE, THE SMALL TOWN, RURAL AMERICA 
Almost everyone has a rough idea of the history: at one time sorne 90% of 
Arnericans lived on farms, today the fraction is roughly 2.8%.10 As material entities, of 
course, the farms, the countryside, the small towns, still exist, andas anyone can plainly 
see, they still occupy a lot of geographic space. What cannot be as plainly seen, however, 
is the extent to which American agriculture has been «industrialized.» Today it more 
nearly approximates the ideal type of rationalized, highly mechanized, large-scale 
commercial production - of corporate agribusiness - than that of the single family 
farm. The gradual transformation of agriculture was accompanied by the draining of 
8. Or, in its vulgar form, «God's country.» M.H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism (New 
York: Norton, 1971 ); Perry Miller, Nature's Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). 
9. Bill Mc.Kibben, «An Explosion of Green,» Atlantic Monthly (April, 1995), pp. 61-83.) 
1 O. The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimate of the U .S. farm population in 1986 was 
2.8% of the national population. See National Research Council, Alternative Agriculture (Was-
hington, D.C.: Nationa!Academy Press, 1989), pp, 33-34. 
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wealth and power - often of life itself - from the country town. As early as 1926, 
Thorstein Ve bien described how retail business in American small towns was losing its 
independence, and how it was becoming a mere tributory of national corporate enterprise. 
So far as it had been a quasi-autonomous unit of economic, political, and cultural life, 
Veblen implied, the small town was dying. 11 
Today many small towns and villages in the countryside are more dead than 
ali ve. Along the main streets ofthe towns near my family 's place in southwestern Maine, 
many shops, restaurants, and movie theatres are closed, empty, boarded up. That is 
partly because the population is shrin.king (the young still are moving to cities in search 
of jobs), and partly because the merchants cannot compete with the outlets of national 
corporations housed in nearby shopping malls. Just about every rural family, no matter 
how poor, owns at least one car - the automobile surely has played a majar role in 
divesting small towns of their commercial viability. One Jarge shopping mall, or even, 
for that matter, one of the latest gargantuan-style discount department stores (a K-Mart 
or Wal-Mart) located at a strategic highway intersection can singlehandedly kill off 
much of the retail business in severa! towns. Such losses sap the vitality oftown culture. 
When local businessmen fail, a major source of govemance, civic voluntarism, and 
philanthropy dries up, and the result is an immeasurable decline in communal energy, 
good will, and self-esteem. 
Since Veblen 's time the process of integrating all aspects of village and small 
town life in to Jarge national systems - technological, economic, cultural, informational 
- has accelerated. E ven at ground leve!, however, mucb of this loss of local autonomy 
is hidden from view. To appreciate its extent, one must take account of all the largely 
invisible telephonic and computerized information, financial, mail-order, and marke-
ting networks; of the economic and cultural influence of - including the massive 
inculcation of consumerist values by - radio, television and video; and of the national 
circulation of popular music, film, and periodicals - all of these connect the business 
enterprises, homes, work, leisure activities, and mental Jives of people in the villages, 
small towns, and the countryside with systems originating in urban centers of wealth, 
power, communications, and cultural production. The significance of the sbopping mall 
is by no means merely economic. It introduces a branch of postmodern culture to small 
town America. At the mal! customers can enjoy man y pleasures of the global marketplace: 
McDonald's and other fast foods and intemational consumer items, movies and other 
kinds of entertainment, including sorne provided by theme parks. Many shopping malls 
are designed as small scale theme parks in the Disney style.12 This transformation of the 
11 . Thorstein Veblen, «The Country Town,» in Max Lemer, ed ., The Portahle Vehlen 
(New York: Viking, 1948), pp. 407-30. 
12. For a witty account of the shopping mall-theme park connection to the postmodem 
global order, see Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. Me World (New York: Times Books, 1995). 
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countryside must be seen as in large measure part of its incorporation into a national -
and often, by now intemational - matrix of electronically linked, high-tech systems of 
commerce and entertainment. 
Another recent development in the countryside is a novel kind of dispersed 
settlement, sometimes called «ruburbia,» that dispenses with man y features of traditional 
communities. 13 lt is created by the piecemeal dispersa!, beyond the suburbs - beyond 
the old exurbia - of industry, small business, and residential housing. There always 
have been people who preferred to Jive «out» in the countryside, but that usually meant 
«Out of town,» that is, belonging to - yet living on the outskirts of - an established 
community. Ruburbia is different. It has emerged in two kinds ofhitherto underdeveloped 
terrain: the least productive agricultura! areas beyond the outer rim of suburbs, and the 
truly remote areas of sparsely settled states like Arkansas, New Hampshire, North Ca-
rolina, and North Dakota. 
The decisive feature of ruburbia is «piecemeal dispersa!.» In man y counties 
in these less urbanized states the population may have increased by as much as 
300-400% in a ten year period, but without any corresponding growth in the 
population of towns or cities. Sorne new growth counties in North Carolina or 
Arizona have populations of 200,000, yet they contain no communities of more 
than 3,000 people. 14 Housing in ruburbia is typified by isolated single-family homes 
on relatively large plots of land close to outdoor recreation. Such locations -
where no other houses are within sight or even, in many cases, within walking distance 
- satisfy the unappeasable desire of Americans for independcnce. This forro of life 
appeals to the comfortably retired; to skilled workers in dispersed high-tech, flexible 
production industries; and to the self-employed- writers, consultants, private investors, 
and technical experts - who constitute the white collar work force of the growing 
electronic cottage industries. For the corporations that locate in ruburbia , the chief 
attractions are plentiful, inexpensive land; the availability of a skiHed, homogeneous 
(predominantly white), non-union labor force; low taxes, and the hope of dispensing 
with sorne local and state govemmental regulations. 
The dominant ethos of ruburbia is anti-urban and, perhaps more significan!, anti-
suburban. Ruburbanites value proxirnity to open spaces for outdoor recreation (especially 
13. Here I draw on observations made in an earlíer essay, «The American Ideology of 
Space,» in Stuart Wrede and William Howard Adams, eds., D enatured Versions; Landscape and 
Culture in rhe Twentierh Century (New York: The Museum of Modem Art, 1988), pp.75-6. See 
also John Herbers, The New American Heartland: America's Flight Beyond the Suburbs and How 
it is Changing Our Furure (New York, 1986). 
14. John Herbers, The New Heartlond: America·s Flighr Beyond the Suburhs and How it 
is Changing Our Future (New York, 1986). See also William K. Stevens, «A Rural Landscape, 
But an Urban Boom,» New York Times, August 8, 1988. This is an account of more than 500 
counties in the U.S. whose population had grown by almost 14% in the l 980s without an equivalen! 
growth of towns or cities. 
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hunting and fishing), and the long distance that separates them from those urban 
conditions - costly and inferior housing; high taxes; crime; drugs; noise; political, 
racial and ethnic tensions - which have been seeping, in recent decades, from cities 
into suburbs. This decentralized pattem of settlement creates an odd sort of community 
- or anti-community - whose built core may consist of little more than a strip, a 
line-up of stores or a shopping mall and a few services along a highway. The 
regional school and a church or two are Jocated, more or less randomly, on nearby 
secondary roads. Although created to satisfy the urge for independence, life in 
ruburbia - at least for those who work outside their homes -entails even greater 
reliance on the automobile and the long-distance commute than life in suburbia. 
In the postmodern era, escape from organized communities also is Jikely to result 
in greater dependence on electronic networks of communication. Despite, or 
because of, their embrace of family-oriented privatism, ruburbanites end up relying 
on the electronic media for many of their contacts with the outside world. Sorne 
are virtual survivalists, proud of their principled unconcern for the cities and their 
undeserving (mostly non-white) inhabitants. In its militant form this proto-racist 
mindset - exemplified by the National Rifle Association and the prívate militias 
of the rural West - is anti-liberal, anti-intellectual, anti-government. It expresses 
the soured hopes and resentments of those who still feel the Jure of a long-gone 
rural America, and of the utopian fantasies of a simple, individualistic life that it 
continues to evoke. 
4. THE POSTMODERN CITY: DECENTRALIZED, DISPERSED, 
STRATIFIED, AND GLOBALLY CONNECTED 
The archeology of the older American cities maps a sequence of group arrivals 
and replacements. On their arrival, the first settlers, attracted by sorne natural or 
technological advantage - a harbor, waterfall, or road juncture - had built what would 
become the new city's center. Then, having done their work and improved their own 
lot, they moved out to a greener, more spacious, less crowded terrain, and a new cohort, 
usually made up of relatively poor, propertyless working people - who often belonged 
to another ethnic or racial group- replaced them. When this process had been repeated 
a few times, the city took the form of an older core surrounded by concentric circles of 
increasingly distan! suburbs. The impulse to escape from urban density and complexity 
is a variant of the pastoral motive inscribed in much of classic American art and 
expression. The ideal of Jeffersonian pastoral was a society of the «middle landscape,» 
a polity capable of reconciling the imperatives of technological progress with an 
accommodation to nature; for many Americans this goal was represented by the cherished 
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icon of a detached, single family home on an expanse of green, privately owned 
land. 15 
This centrifuga} pattem of American development often reversed certain key 
features ofthe typical European pattem. In Europe the bourgeoisie usually reserved for 
itself the choice sites in the central city; in the premodem era many of those sites -
grand palaces set in handsome parks and gardens - had belonged to the monarchs, 
aristocrats, and clerics of established churches - ranks outlawed in the American 
republic. In America, accordingly, the poorest minority groups often are confined to 
central city ghettoes, whereas in Europe their counterparts are more likely to be relegated 
to crowded outlying suburbs.16 
Man y changes in the character of the American city during the last century anda 
half stem from a complex two-way flow of population: a simultaneous movement into 
and out of the central cities. While one large stream of the nation's population was 
flowing from the countryside to the cities, another was flowing from the cities to the 
suburbs. Man y central cities thus ha ve lost most of their white residents who can afford 
to own a car and a home in a suburb with - or so they hope - better schools, lower 
crirne rates, cleaner air, less noise, and more neighbors whp resemble themselves. This 
migration has been encouraged by energetic real-estate developers and, more recently, 
by the managers of high-tech industries and other entrepreneurs who have set up shop 
on the city's periphery. A major driving force in the reshaping of the cities, as Mike 
Davis argues in his bitter, satírica! book about Los Angeles, City o/ Quartz, is the high 
profitability of real estate development and speculation, and its capacity to attract large 
amounts of foreign capital - much of it originating, in the case of L.A., in Japan.17 
One result of the outflow of city residents has been the emergence of Edge City, 
a satellite urban center that has developed along the suburban perimeters of such 
metropolitan areas as Washington, D.C.; New York, Los Angeles, Houston, or Atlanta. 
An Edge City, strictly defined, is a secondary urban core in ornear suburbia; to qualify 
it should have at least five mi Ilion feet of office space and more jobs than housing, i.e .. 
more people commuting into the Edge City than out of it each day. A single metropolis 
like Washington, D.C., may have as many as fifteen edge cities. 1s 
15. Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garde11: Tech110/ogy a11d the Pastoral Ideal in America 
(New York: Oxford University, 1964 ); «Pastoralism in America,» in Sacvan Bercovitch and Myra 
Jehlen, eds., ldeo/ofiy and Classic American literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), pp.36-69; and «Does Pastoralism Have a Future? ,» in Jobo Dixon Hunt, ed., The Pastoral 
Landscape (Washington, D.C: National Gallery of Art, 1992), pp. 109-225. 
16. Robert Fishman. Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and F all of Suhurbia (New York: Basic 
Books, 1987). 
17. Mike Da vis, City of Quartz, Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (New York: Vintage, 
1992). 
18. Joel Garreau, The Emerging Cities of Washinfiton , Washington Post Reprint Series, 
1987-8; Edge City, Lije on the New Frontier (New York: Doubleday, 1991). 
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But perhaps the most striking recent development is the current transformation 
of the central cities themselves. This is another ambiguous, or dual process, of related 
decline and growth, as manifested, first, by the exodus - and the inner dispersa! - of 
the residential population, and second, by the construction of a new, lavish, downtown 
core of financia) and transnational corporate enterprise. 
Quite apart from the exodus to suburbia, Edge City, and ruburbia, the residential 
population is now dispersing inside the central cities themselves. With the decline of 
Iarge-scale industrial production, one of the chief motives leading to high population 
density - the perceived advantage of living near one 's workplace - is disappearing. 
As a result, we are seeing a thinning out of the central city population. In the Chicago 
metropolitan region, for example, the population grew by only 4% between 1970 and 
1990, but land use for residential purposes increased by 46%, and suburban commercial 
and industrial land consumption increased by 74%. The whole city is spreading out or, 
as it were, de-congesting. In 1970 the core city of Chicago accounted for 48% of the 
metropolitan region's population and nearly 60% of its jobs. By 1990, however, the 
core had only 38% of the people and 37% of the jobs in the region. 19 The accelerating 
dispersa) of the population in space is a striking and, in the long run perhaps, a promising 
development; it opens up intriguing opportunities for innovative urban planners and 
landscape architects to refashion the inner cityscape. 
But that rehabilitation may be a long time off. For many of its residents, 
meanwhile, the central cities remain oppressively divided. The people may be dispersing 
in space, but their neighborhoods are as segregated as ever. If anything, economic, 
racial, and ethnic boundaries are becoming more pronounced. This is not, of course, 
objectionable to ali of the groups concemed. Nor is it the result, as sorne contend, of the 
spontaneous operation of market forces. Since 1970, in fact, federal tax Iaws and social 
policies have helped to effect a substantial redistribution of wealth and power from 
poor, relatively propertyless, people to those who control most of the nation 's capital. 
Recent studies show that the United States is now the most economically stratified of 
the wealthy industrial nations, with the greatest discrepancy between the rich and the 
poor. The wealthiest 1 % of American households -those whose average net worth is 
at Ieast $2.3 million - owns almost 40% of the nation's wealth. In the 1980s 20% of 
families with the highest incomes made 75% of the gains in family income, and that 
same minority also controlled virtually 100% ofthe decade's increase in wealth. On the 
other hand, 20% of American families with the lowest incomes eamed only 5.7% of ali 
the after-tax income in the United States. According to another new study, poor children 
in the United States are poorer than the children in all but two of eighteen Western 
19. Elmer W. Johnson, ProjectReport, «The Dispersed and Stratified Metropolis,» Bul/etin, 
The American Academy of Arts and Sciences. April, 1995, pp. 5-18; see also, Robert Fishman, 
«Megalopolis Unbound,» Wilson Quarrerly, Winter, 1990. 
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industrialized nations.20 Anyone who cares to see the material embodiment of this 
increasing socio-economic stratification has only to walk through ali of the 
neighborhoods - from the most affluent suburb to the most squalid ghetto - of just 
about any American city today. 
And yet, along with the dispersa! and stratification of the central city population 
-and this is the second, ostensibly more positive, side of curren! developments - the 
downtown cores of many American cities have in recent years received an impressive 
infusion of a new sort of corporate wealth and energy. The visible result has been the 
construction of partly new, partly rebuilt downtown financia! districts. They consist of 
banks, insurance companies, and other financia] institutions; large, imposing hotels; 
convention centers; upscale shopping malls, and possibly a few luxury apartment houses, 
ali clustered around the new skyscraper headquarters of large transnational corporations. 
This postmodem downtown is a kind of mini-Wall Street, and in many cities its high-
rise office buildings (postmodemist in style of course) are adjacent to the most debilitated 
and degrading inner city slums.21 
Ali of this suggests a disconcerting trend toward the domination of this refurbished 
inner city by an intemational monied oligarchy. It is striking that theorists of 
postmodemism, such as Fredric Jameson, choose the new downtown Los Angeles, with 
its ostentatious hotels, banks, and high-rise office towers, to illustrate the essential 
character of the postmodemist mentality.22 As it happens, moreover, the area housing 
these new structures is close to the site of the nation 's most violent urban riots in recent 
decades. ll is hard to avoid the idea that this juxtaposition of postmodem architectural 
grandeur with the grim ghettoes that generate such explosive desperation is emblematic 
of our emerging postmodem social arder. 
S. POSTMODERNITY AS THE ERA OF HIGH-TECH GLOBAL OLIGARCHY 
In the era of postmodemity, more Americans than ever live in cities, and yet, for 
purposes of socio-economic, political, and cultural understanding, the concept of the 
city - as a place distinct from the countryside and the wildemess - has lost much of 
its usefulness. It no longer is useful to think of problems like racism, poverty, violence, 
20. Keith Bradsher, «Gap in Wealth in U.S. Called Widest in West,» New York Times, 17 
April 1995, pp. Al. D4; see also the editorial comment, «The Rich Get Richer Faster,» New York 
Times. 18 April 1995, p. A24; also Keith Bradsher, «Low Ranking for Poor American Children; 
U.S. Youth Among Worst Off in Study of 18 Industrialized Nalions,» New York Times. 14 August 
1995, p.A9; the study compares theextentofthe gap between rich and poorchildren in 18 nations, 
and shows that the U.S. ranks 16th - that the gap is larger only in Israel and Ireland. 
2 1. For a revealing account of this process of decentralization and recentralization, see 
Chapter VII, «lt Ali Comes Together in Los Angeles,» in Soja, Postmodern Geographies. 
22. See Jameson, Postmodemism. 
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and crime as «city problems.» The reason for downplaying the urban character of these 
problems is not, of course, that cities have become less important; on the contrary, they, 
or rather the networks of wealth, power, communication, and transportation that originate 
in cities, and whose chief nodes are located in cities, have become all-important. 
But the distinction must be emphasized: it is the networks of communication, 
wealth, and power, not the cities as such, as places ofhabitation - as communities, that 
have become all-important in the era of postmodemity. Back in the 1970s, in the aftermath 
of the civil rights movement, American black communities discovered how relatively 
unimportant the cities had become as potential siles of local political power. To cope 
with conditions created by white flight to the suburbs, urban blacks took up electoral 
politics. In severa! large American cities they organized successful coalitions, elected 
black mayors, and won control of the city govemment, only to find that as a locus of 
political power the city had become impotent. American cities no longer were capable, 
if they ever were, of mobilizing enough wealth and power to effect significant change. 
The fact is that neither the old topographical categories - city, countryside, wildemess 
- nor the newer ones - metropolis, suburbia, Edge City, ruburbia - are very helpful 
in elucidating the pattem of change in the era of postmodemity. 
In retrospect, it seems evident that we Americans, represented by the views of 
Frederick Jackson Tumer, leader of our «frontier» school of historians, have tended to 
exaggerate the relative importance of geography - or of space-based institutions and 
beliefs - in the development of our society. As the ecological historian, William Cronon, 
demonstrates in his revealing study, Nature's Metropolis, the growth of Chicago was 
intricately and inextricably bound up, from the outset, with the development of a vast 
hinterland - much of it regarded as «wilderness» - stretching all the way to the Sierra 
Nevada.23 In compelling detail, Cronon shows how Chicago and its environs were knit 
to each other by systems oftransportation (especially the railroads), finance (especially 
the banks, stock and commodities markets, and the channels they provided for the flow 
of capital), communications, and marketing. This network of economic relations is 
vividly manifested by the total interdependence of cattle-raising on the range lands of 
the West and Chicago's crucially important meat-packing industry. The result was to 
make of the city and the entire mid-continental countryside a complex, more or less 
unified built environment that Cronon calls «second nature.» This second nature in 
effect was constructed on top of, and in large measure masked the presence of, the 
original «first [or nonhuman] nature.» What was decisive in the history of this 
development, finally, was neither Chicago nor its hinterland; it was the network of 
wealth and power that bound them together. Cronon's analysis is invaluable in tracing 
the prehistory of postmodernity, which might be thought of as a name for the latest 
23. William Cronon, Nature's Metropo/is, Chicago and the Great West (New York: Norton, 
1991). 
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stage in the serial project of industrialization, electronic rationalization, and the 
globalizing of corporate capitalism. 
In conclusion, and as a cautionary tale about the postmodern shaping of the 
American landscape, consider the story ofBenjamin Thompson's redesign, in 1975, of 
the Faneuil Hall area in downtown Boston. At the time his refashioning of this venera-
ble colonial si te into a general commodity marketplace was widely praised asan exemplar 
of innovative, practical, civica!ly responsible, aesthetically sensitive, historie restoration. 
For this splendid project, as well as his other work, Thompson won the highest award 
of the American Institute of Architecture. The Faneuil Hall Marketplace q uickly became 
a tourist attraction, and people from all over the world flocked to see it. It always was 
crowded. The tenants, most of them local retail merchants, thrived. Ali in ali, it was a 
stunning success, but that success, as it tumed out, undermined Thompson's initial 
purpose. He had designed the market, in accordance with its historie function, to house 
a variety of small shops selling fresh foodstuffs and other domestic commodities, and 
thus to enhance the quality of daily life in Boston; but the merchants, eager to cash in on 
the out-of-town tourist trade, replaced those commodities with far more lucrative fast 
foods and souvenir kitsch. In the event, many of the original merchants sold out; much 
of the local clientele stopped coming, and the whole project lost much of its distinctive 
Boston identity, past and present. Recently Thompson, now 76, returned for another 
look. He was deeply disappointed. «That's not my Faneuil Hall,» he told the Boston 
G/obe: 
We wanted real proprietors who would run the kind of establishment where 
you could meet the guy who makes the clam chowder and the one who bakes the 
bread. We didn 't want national franchises. We wanted Boston voters and taxpayers, 
people who were part of the community, Red Sox and Celtic fans. Developers 
have problems with that attitude. They like banks or a telephone company or a 
Hyatt hotel to take hu ge chunks of space. 24 
There is nothing new, to be sure, about the shaping of the American landscape by 
the power and influence of capital investment. Nevertheless, there is something about 
the case of the Faneuil Hall Marketplace, when considered in the context of the 
developing global marketplace, that makes it qualitatively different: it epitomizes the 
dominant meaning of postmodemity as the name for the current transformation of life 
around the world. A hint of that meaning can be heard in Thompson 's distinction between 
what he wanted, namely, to create a place for «real proprietors, ... people who were part 
of the community,» and what he got: the fulfillment of the aims, as he says, of developers 
24. The Boston Globe. June 15, 1995, pp. 69, 74. 
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of large banks, hotels, telephone companies, and high-rise office towers. Here local 
interests ha ve been superseded --erased - by the abstract imperatives of the market. 
By «local interests» 1 mean virtually everything having to do with the lives of ordinary 
people, the discrete persons who live and work in Boston, and with the quality of their 
domestic, aesthetic, and sensory experience. 
What is distinctive, then, about the postmodem era is the widening schism between 
the two strata oflife we see wherever we look closely at the American landscape today. 
The upper Jevel is held together by a global web of electronic comrnunications; it makes 
possible the instantaneous transmission of general information, news, money, and 
commercial entertainment around the world. The people who live on this stratum of 
society are we!leducated, economically privileged, technically sophisticated, members 
of a cosmopolitan meritocracy. They constitute what is becoming a new kind of monied, 
global elite. Their natural habitats are the world 's great financia] and communications 
centers. These cities are the spatial nodes in the intemarional electronic web that fonns 
the upper stratum of postmodemity. 
Life on the lower stratum, where local and parochial interests struggle for survival, 
is not easily described because in large parts of the world - the former Soviet Union, 
the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, much of Africa - it is so chaotic. It resembles 
nothing so much as the Hobbesian war of each against ali. lt is the location of retrograde, 
often racist, nationalisms or fundamentalist religious movements. Just as the small towns 
of America have lost much of their autonomy, wealth, and power, so ha ve many nation 
states. Indeed, there is reason to suppose that postmodemity may be making the nation 
state itself obsolete. 
In conclusion, then, I want to emphasize the widening gap between the two strata 
as the decisive feature of postmodemity. If the upper stratum promises to realize the old 
fantasy of One World, the lower stratum is a study in social entropy - that is, the 
tendency of human systems to break down. These trends are accentuated by the 
apotheosis of the market, and the widespread hostility toward govemments. Whatever 
the impressive efficacy of markets in allocating resources and distributing commodities, 
they are notoriously ineffectual in furthering such common goods as social justice, 
democracy, health, education, and the general welfare. 
1 bate to close on such a grim note. Like most optimistic Americans, I prefer 
upbeat endings. If there is any consolation to be had from this sorry prospect, however, 
it requires the prior mention of an even gloomier event that has been hanging over the 
world since Hiroshima: an oncoming ecological apocalypse. On days when the worst 
case scenario of the biocentric environmentalists strikes me as credible, I am able to 
add a positive postscript to this conception of postmodemity. To deal with a truly 
catastrophic threat to the planetary ecosystem, after ali , humanity obviously will require 
the capacity for unified global action. It is consoling, therefore, to think that the historie 
mission of postmodemity is to build the global infrastrucrure that we ultimately will 
need to insure human survival. 
